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Abstract-Wireless sensor networks represent a new 
generation of real-time embedded systems with 
significantly different communication constraints from 
the traditional networked systems. With their 
development, a new attack called a path-based DoS 
(PDoS) attack has appeared.  In a PDoS attack, an 
adversary, either inside or outside the network, 
overwhelms sensor nodes by flooding a multi-hop end-
to-end communication path with either replayed packets 
or injected spurious packets. In this article, we propose a 
solution using mobile agents which can detect PDoS 
attacks easily. 
Keywords-Denial of Service Attack, Detection, Sensor 
Networks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The path-based DoS attack was first described in detail 
and named by Deng et. al. in [4]. They pointed out that a 
PDoS attack, by exhausting the batteries of several nodes, 
has the potential to disable a much wider region than simply 
a single path due to the standard tree structure topology of a 
WSN. WSNs tend to be unstable and have limited resource 
capacity and so are vulnerable to DoS attacks.  
Figure 1 shows how PDoS attacks work. A standard 
PDoS attack begins with the compromise of member nodes 
and aggregator nodes which are then used to flood the 
intermediate and sink nodes with packets along the routing 
paths. The resulting excessive power consumption can lead 
to a quick death of a WSN because the nodes are unable to 
return to sleep mode in order to conserve power.  
Few authors have tackled the problem of PDoS attacks on 
a WSN. In this paper, we introduce a novel method of using 
mobile agents in the WSN which permit us to detect these 
attacks. To our knowledge, the only application of mobile 
agents in sensor networks to appear in the literature is in the 
paper of Tong [8], but these are not used for of attack.  
Our methods are described in detail in sections 2 and 3. In 
section 4, we evaluate the usefulness of our techniques and 
in section 5, describe work which remains for future papers. 
Figure 1. PDoS in WSNs 
      
II. WORKING MODEL 
We assume the WSN has a tree-structure topology, a 
single base station and four types of nodes as shown in 
Figure 2. A description of the node and base station 
functions can be found in [6].  
We add a mobile agent (MA) to the WSN (several may be 
added in a large system) and assume that there is no 
restriction on its computing power.  
The work of [8] demonstrates that mobile agents (MAs) 
are very useful in WSNs because of their ability to reduce 
network load, encapsulate protocols and are robust and 
fault-tolerant. We assume that the base station and MA are 
trusted and can never be compromised by attackers.  
In order to distinguish between nodes which have been 
compromised and those which have not, we need to 
introduce a labeling for each node. We base this labeling on 
3-dimensional co-ordinates in space [7], which can be 
obtained by geographical location using triangulation. For 
example, a node whose coordinates are 59°Latitude, 
29°Longitude and height 2 metres has ID 59:29:2. We 
assume that nodes cannot be positioned in the same 
geographical location.  
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Figure 2. Tree Structure of a WSN 
III. DETECTION 
Several methods for detecting DoS attacks in general 
networks have been proposed.  
More recently, en-route filtering schemes have been 
proposed for intermediate nodes to filter false data generated 
by malicious aggregator nodes as well as to detect intruders 
engaged in what we have termed PDoS attacks [9] [10]. The 
basic idea is that the intermediate nodes share some keys 
with the member nodes in a node group or cluster. Member 
nodes generate MACs for the reported data using the shared 
keys, and intermediate nodes can verify the MACs before 
forwarding packets. In the SEF scheme proposed by Ye et. 
al., the Bloom filter [9] is used to reduce the size of MACs 
and ensure their security. The intermediate nodes and 
member nodes use randomly pre-distributed keys to 
generate and verify MACs. In this scheme, it is highly likely 
that the false data will be dropped by one of the intermediate 
nodes and will not reach the base station.  However, there 
are several problems with the SEF scheme. First, SEF uses a 
probabilistic approach. It cannot guarantee that every 
spurious packet will be filtered out on the path. In addition 
statistically, a spurious packet will be forwarded for a 
certain number of nodes before it is filtered out.  Second, the 
message overhead of SEF is still large. The size of the 
Bloom filter is 14 bytes long, which is about half of the data 
payload of a TinyOS packet.  
Jing et. al. [4] developed a method of using one-way hash 
chains to protect end-to-end communications in WSNs 
against PDoS attacks. It prevents PDoS attacks from the 
intermediate nodes or from outside sources capable of 
launching PDoS attacks, since an adversary cannot generate 
the next valid OHC number, while replayed old OHC 
numbers will be dropped. Second, the memory and 
computational costs of OHC execution are quite lightweight.  
Third, this scheme tolerates packet losses.  But there are also 
some obvious disadvantages. One of them is it cannot 
constrain PDoS attacks by the compromised nodes in 
WSNs, especially the nodes which store the hash function. 
All of the work using MACS results in high local 
computing costs and subsequent death of nodes. The inter-
leaved key scheme has extremely high communication 
overhead. We therefore adapt the low cost one-way hash 
chain idea of Jing et. al., but efficiently employ a mobile 
agent to detect if the sender of the hash has been 
compromised. 
    Our detection solution includes a one-way hash chain, a 
traffic control algorithm, detection of node compromise and 
node failure and a voting algorithm. We choose the one-way 
hash chain as it has low computational requirements and is 
easy to deploy [4]. The one-way hash chain is used to detect 
any compromised node except for source nodes. We use a 
traffic control algorithm to detect the misbehavior of source 
nodes since the adversary could compromise them to access 
the one-way hash function. We also use message 
broadcasting from the MA to distinguish between node 
failure and node compromise, because node failure which is 
a technical problem rather than an attack could generate 
higher traffic flow in a local area or along some paths. 
Finally, a voting algorithm is used to decide whether 
suspicious nodes have been compromised based on the votes 
from their neighbour nodes. 
A. TRAFFIC CONTROL ALGORITHM 
   When one node wants to send packets to its neighbour 
nodes, not only will it include a hash function value, but also 
it includes its node ID in order to let the MA recognize the 
source of packets and record them into a traffic table. In 
Table 1, for each 5 second interval, the number of packets 
passing through the corresponding node is given in the 
column. If the traffic in each interval is normal, that is, 
below a certain given threshold W, the MA will simply 
delete the contents of the table and refresh it for the next 
time-frame. If the traffic of certain nodes in the table is 
abnormal (i.e. is above W), the MA will take further steps to 
tell whether the node has failed or been compromised. 
TABLE I  
NUMBER OF PACKETS FOR A GIVEN NODE IN 
SEVERAL TIME INTERVALS 
Node ID 0-5 
secs 
5-
10secs 
10-
15secs 
15-
20secs 
20-25
secs 
21:34:1 22 43 72 32 45 
22:35:0 13 65 37 99 24 
24:30:2 87 55 32 40 14 
The algorithm below detects abnormal traffic by choosing 
a threshold W and counting the number of times the traffic 
through a specific node exceeds W in a fixed table. If this 
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occurs more than say w times, the MA then considers the 
node to be compromised or failed, but cannot tell which.  
(The values of w and W can be set initially and adjusted 
using experimental information over time.) Let T be the 
number of intervals in the table and P(i,j) be the table entry in 
row i and column j. The following is the pseudo code: 
PROCEDURE PDoSDetectionofNode_i 
Set m=0 
While (j = 0; j ++; j <= T)   // wait for timeout and 
start next interval check 
Case (P(i,j)≤W) // normal state 
End PROCEDURE 
Case (P(i,j) > W)   // probably abnormal state 
m = m + 1  // accumulate the warning times for 
that node 
If (m≥w)   // enter abnormal state 
 PROCEDURE NodeFailureDetection   
//used to detect node failure 
End If 
End Case 
End While 
End PROCEDURE
The procedure for Node Failure Detection is described in 
the next section. 
B. DETECTION FOR NODE FAILURE 
Both node compromise and node failure can lead to 
abnormal traffic flow during a short period or in a localized 
area of a WSN. So we have to eliminate the node failure 
condition in order to make our Traffic Control algorithm 
work well. When the MA goes into PROCEDURE 
NodeFailureDetection, it will simply broadcast a check 
message to all the nodes in the WSN. The MA counts the 
number of acknowledgment (ACK) packets received and 
compares with the number of nodes which do not reply, in 
order to determine the failed nodes. Responding nodes 
include their IDs and this allows the MA to determine the 
IDs of the non-responding nodes. The MA concludes that all 
non-responding nodes have failed and reports this to a 
technical support team. 
C. VOTING ALGORITHM FOR NODE COMPROMISE 
In this section, we now determine which of the nodes that 
did respond to the MA message are in fact compromised. To 
do this, we use the MA to broadcast a new random message 
at random times to all the responding nodes exhibiting 
abnormal traffic patterns. When these nodes receive this 
message, they will try to send the same message to their 
neighbor nodes. However, as described in the well-known 
Byzantine Generals Problem [5], compromised nodes will 
attempt to transmit conflicting information to other parts of 
the system. We base our voting algorithm on this fact: if 
node A receives the same message from node B and the 
MA, node A will vote that node B is not compromised and 
send back this voting result along with both IDs to the MA. 
When the MA has received a certain number of votes 
against a node, the MA will decide that node has been 
compromised. The MA now takes steps to recover the 
compromised node.  Figure 3 shows how voting algorithm 
for node compromise works. 
          
Figure 3. Message sending between nodes and the MA 
    We can assume that the WSN has sufficient nodes to 
make such a voting algorithm reliable. On the other hand, in 
very large-scale WSNs, there could be thousands of nodes, 
in which case several MAs could be applied in order to 
implement the detection algorithm. One advantage of using 
MAs is that they can provide seamless technology to a very 
big network. So there are no problems in deploying more of 
them into WSNs.   
    In addition, node compromise is a fairly slow process, as 
mentioned in [2] when detection methods are in place. Thus 
it is unlikely, that at any given time, more than half the 
nodes would be compromised. 
IV. EVALUATION 
    For our simulation model we generate 50 nodes in a 
200x200m square area. The radio transmission range is 40 
meters and the data rate of the wireless link is 2Mbps.  The 
data traffic is generated by constant bit rate with an 
interarrival time of 25ms. For each node there are two 
transmission queues, one for control packets and one for 
data packets. The control queue is used for control packets 
such as route requests and it always has higher priority than 
the data queue. We also set up a timer if a packet has not 
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reached the destination in 10 seconds. The packet length for 
data packets is 10kbits with 500 bits for the header message. 
The queue length for data packets is 50 for all nodes. The 
timer which is used to resend the message if there is no 
reply is set to 50 ms. 
    Figure 5 compares the time to detect attacks between our 
method, the en-route filtering method and the SEF method. 
We measure the detection time in seconds and the attack 
rate in SYN/sec. 
As indicated, our method is significantly better than the 
others when the attack rate is between 17 SYN/sec and 28 
SYN/sec. 
Detection under Defferent Attack Rate
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Attack Rate (SYN packets/sec)
Ti
m
e 
to
 
De
te
ct
 
(se
c)
En-route filting
SEF
Our Method
Figure 5. Detection Time under Different Attack Rate 
As indicated, our method is significantly better than the 
others when the attack rate is between 16 SYN/sec and 28 
SYN/sec. For large attack rates, we can see it spends less 
time to detect it.   
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Figure 6. Energy Comparison on Detection 
Figure 6 shows the energy comparison between each 
detection method. We can see our method cost less energy 
on detect the attacks. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
     We have presented a new detection method for node 
compromise in PDoS attacks in a WSN and evaluated our 
results, based on small WSNs, including comparison with 
other work. Our work demonstrates the efficiency of our 
detection methods in comparison with existing methods 
when only a few nodes have been compromised. 
In future work, we will implement these methods in large-
scale WSNs. We will also use mobile agents to develop 
response and recovery methods in PDoS attacks 
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